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Why do liberals and conservatives often fail to see eye-to-eye on social policies that seek to 
reduce economic inequality in the United States? I integrate a historical/cultural perspective with 
contemporary research on liberals’ and conservatives’ motivations to show that social policy 
disagreements result in part from a fundamental difference between how liberals and 
conservatives attempt to organize and understand a complex and ambiguous social world with 
social class categories. Specifically, I first investigated whether liberals and conservatives differ 
in their beliefs of social class as an organizing principle (SCOP) through which they understand 
the world (Study 1). In Study 2, I investigated whether liberals and conservatives differ in their 
SCOP beliefs because of differences in automatic or controlled cognitive processes. I found that 
liberals and conservative experience similar category activation of social class categories, but 
differ in how they deliberately use social class descriptors to describe social others. I then tested 
whether liberals’ and conservatives’ motivations explained ideological differences in SCOP 
beliefs (Study 3). In Study 4, I further investigated whether liberal-conservative differences in 
SCOP beliefs are motivationally driven by experimentally manipulating the relevance of the 
system in question. Finally, Study 5 investigated whether SCOP beliefs explained ideological 
differences in social policy attitudes that address inequality (Study 5). Overall, the present 
research suggests that liberals and conservatives may differ in their social policy attitudes 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re 
winning.” 
 —Warren Buffett 
 
For fervently insisting that United States (US) tax policies be made more egalitarian, 
Warren Buffet became the namesake of former President Barack Obama’s “Buffett Tax” 
legislation, which proposed a 30% income tax for millionaires. Conservatives generally 
disapproved of the legislative effort and criticized Obama throughout his presidential tenure for 
creating superfluous social class distinctions and using them to engage in “class warfare” 
against high-income earners (Rushe, 2011). 
Economic policies like the Buffett Tax that seek to redistribute US wealth and promote 
economic equality have become a widespread issue of contention between liberals and 
conservatives. Liberals often attempt to enact equality-promoting social policies, and in 
response, conservatives often criticize liberals for dragging out unnecessary “social class” 
differences for political spectacle (Freeman, 2014; Kraus & Stephens, 2012). Liberal-
conservative disagreements about social and economic disparities are particularly relevant, as 
levels of income equality are the highest they have been since the Great Depression (Piketty, & 
Saez 2014). 
 Why do liberals and conservatives disagree so much on economic policies that seek to 
address inequality in the United States? To date, research has shown that disagreements may 
occur on economic issues because of ideological differences in the tendency to rationalize 
inequality as fair and legitimate (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) or because 
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liberals and conservatives have different “moral” underpinnings (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009). However, I propose that neither of these explanations fully captures the phenomenon 
present in the dialogue and policy attitudes between liberals and conservatives. I propose an 
alternative explanation that joins the historical context of “social class” discourse with a 
theoretical account of how liberals’ and conservatives’ motivations invite tendencies to see the 
world through a lens of social class categorizations. Specifically, I propose that liberals and 
conservatives differ in their tendencies to organize and understand society based on social class 
categories, which subsequently predicts ideological differences in policy attitudes that seek to 
address economic inequality.  
In the present research, I broadly investigated whether conservatives are less likely than 
liberals to use social categories as an organizing principle for society and social others. Next, I 
investigated whether ideological differences in the tendency to categorize others based on social 
class groups occur via deliberate adjustments made during interpersonal perception. Following 
up on this, I tested whether ideological differences in the tendency to organize and understand 
society with social class categories is motivated by 1) epistemic needs and 2) desires to justify 
the status quo and maintain social inequality. Finally, I examined whether the tendency to 
organize and understand society based on social class categories explains the relationship 
between ideology and attitudes towards redistributive social policies. 
1.1 Social Categorizations Serve Motivations  
Contemporary empirical (social psychological) research. Before considering the 
ideological role that social categorizations have in reaffirming the societal status quo and social 
inequality, it is necessary to understand what social categorizations are and how they shape 
cognition. Social categorizations organize perceived individuals into social “groups” associated 
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with content knowledge about the group itself, such as their attitudes, goals/intentions, or 
personality (Bodenhausen, Kang, & Peery, 2012; Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995). Social 
categorizations assume a fundamental role in human cognition because they help perform the 
enormous task of organizing and structuring knowledge of social others (Crisp & Hewstone, 
2007). Importantly, social categorizations may also serve specific psychological motives, two of 
which are of central relevance; epistemic functions for certainty and predictability, and desires 
to reaffirm the status quo and social hierarchy. In the subsections to follow, I discuss how social 
categories specifically serve these psychological needs, and how social class categories 
function in a similar yet unique way.  
Epistemic needs. Social categories serve epistemic motives for structure, certainty, and 
predictability by allowing individuals to think “categorically” about others (Allport, 1954; Bem, 
1981, 1985; Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & 
Spencer, 2003; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Tajfel, 1981). By thinking of social others in this 
categorical fashion, social categorizations reduce the complexity of the environment (Bruner, 
1957), provide cognitive clarity (Jones & Thibaut, 1958), and help individuals form coherent 
impressions of others (Heider, 1958). For example, a tendency to organize others by gender 
predicts thinking of opposite-sex members as being relatively homogeneous, thus removing 
nuance from interpersonal perceptions and allowing individuals to arrive at more efficient 
judgments (Frable & Bem, 1985). Likewise, organizing and understanding others through racial 
categorizations, while obscuring meaningful individual differences, eases the burden of 
relatively complex reasoning and information processing (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Hoshino-
Browne & Kunda, 2000). In short, social categorizations fulfill epistemic motives by helping 
make sense of a complex and often uncertain social world.   
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Status quo support. Second, social categorizations may serve motives to maintain the 
status quo and social hierarchy by reaffirming status differences between groups and 
rationalizing those differences as being just and natural (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 
2004; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). For example, seeing sex-based social categories in 
a relatively rigid fashion predicts a tendency for individuals to justify societal differences 
between sexes (Kray, Howland, Russell, & Jackman, 2017; Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & 
Hornsey, 2009), suggesting that sex categorizations correspond with motivations to support 
status differences between men and women. Empirical work on race similarly suggests that 
racial categories serve psychological motives. For example, perceptions that broad racial 
differences (e.g., in behavior, abilities and personality) are biological can justify and legitimize 
racial inequality (Keller, 2005). 
Contemporary theorists. Dovetailing with the above empirical work, contemporary 
theorists have similarly noted that some social categories have historically served motivations 
for status quo and social hierarchy. For example, Sandra Bem (1993) argued that the vocabulary 
and discourse surrounding genders helped maintain centuries of societal inequality between 
men and women. That is, male-female categorizations have emphasized the notion that men and 
women are fundamentally different in nearly all aspects of life, including expectations about 
men’s and women’s social roles, behaviors, expressions of emotions, and desires. As a result, a 
gender-sorted world has systemically reproduced male power and privilege (Bem 1993). Others 
have argued that much like gender, racial categorizations have historically been used to 
reinforce status quo differences, albeit between those of differing skin tones. Like gender, racial 
categories are historically derived and institutionalized categories that sort individuals based on 
physical and behavioral characteristics associated with differing amounts of value, power, and 
5 
 
societal prestige (Markus, 2008; Markus & Moya, 2010). Also like gender, the use of racial 
categories has often historically been motivated by dominant groups (e.g., Whites) with the 
specific purpose of maintaining the interracial status quo and social hierarchy by quelling 
potential economic, political, and cultural threats (Moya & Markus, 2008). This was done, for 
example, by assuming Blacks were intellectually unfit to attend the same schools and work the 
same occupations as Whites. These beliefs systemically permeated through social and political 
channels and undermined the civil rights and economic opportunities of Blacks for decades 
(Markus, 2008). To summarize, empirical and theoretical work suggest that social categories 1) 
serve epistemic functions for certainty and predictability, and 2) reaffirm the status quo and 
social hierarchy.  
1.2 Social Class Categories Serve Motivations  
Defining social class. Before discussing how social class categories may be used to 
disrupt the status quo and promote equality, it is necessary to define “social class.” While 
modern psychologists still struggle to find consensus on how best to define the construct (Kraus 
& Stephens, 2012; Liu et al., 2004), most definitions of social class emphasize traditional 
objective indicators such as income (Drentea, 2000), education (Snibbe & Markus, 2005), and 
occupational prestige (Oakes & Rossi, 2003), the three of which are correlated but unique 
(Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 2003). In the present work, I define social class as a 
collection of individuals based on their position within a social hierarchy based on income, 
education, and occupational prestige. Organizing and understanding the world through a lens of 
social class serves motivations for change and quality in several ways. 
Categorical thinking about class emphasizes inequality. First, thinking categorically 
about social classes emphasizes inequality that exists between them, which can motivate 
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individuals to address group-based differences. This may occur because categorical thinking 
about social others facilitates attitudes that group members share an underlying fundamental 
essence that differentiates them from other groups (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Ryazanov & 
Christenfeld, 2018). For example, thinking about social groups in a “fundamental” fashion can 
be strategically used to serve motivations surrounding hierarchy and status quo by justifying 
status differences between groups (Holt, Morgenroth, & Burnette, 2018). In the specific case of 
social class, categorical thinking may emphasize class-based differences in economic 
opportunities, psychological experiences, and fates in society. By recognizing that systemic 
inequality exists in society, individuals should subsequently be more likely to support social 
policies that address economic disparities (McCall, Burk, Laperrière, & Richeson, 2017). Thus, 
social class categories may motivate individuals to pursue change and alter social hierarchy by 
emphasizing group-based social inequality. 
 Social class provides a lens for understanding hierarchy and advocating for change. 
Cultural and historical origins of social class. A historical perspective is also useful to 
understand how social class categories are used today to serve motivations for change and 
equality. Specifically, the western notion of “social class” was conceptualized to subvert the 
status quo of society’s hierarchical distribution of economic resources (Lukács, 1971). 
Specifically, the hierarchical distribution of income, wealth, and economic opportunities among 
citizens, which I define as the social hierarchy. Karl Marx originally argued that a country’s 
social hierarchy could be split into social “classes” based on their relative control and autonomy 
in the economic or feudal system (Marx & Engels, 1848). By organizing society into these 
different groups, economic and political philosophers like Marx sought to provide ordinary 
citizens with a lens through which they may become “class aware” and recognize that the 
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powers that be have forced them into subservient positions with drastically less opportunity and 
influence (Lukács, 1971). Only once citizens had become aware of these class-based disparities 
might they be able to organize and engage in collective political action (Marx & Engels, 1848). 
For example, recognizing social class disparities in the workplace could promote labor unions 
that would ultimately equalize the power and resources between the ruling and working classes, 
and in doing so promote equality. Thus, unlike sex and race, social classes were historically 
conceptualized as a means to understand society’s social hierarchy and to ultimately disrupt the 
status quo and promote equality. 
Contemporary uses of social class. However, “social class” is not an archaic term from 
philosophers of times gone by. Still today, organizing the world through a lens of class can 
provide individuals with an understanding of how others in the social hierarchy systematically 
differ in their opportunities and outcomes relating to education, occupations, health, and well-
being. For example, modern researchers often point out social-class differences in mortality 
(Adler et al., 1994), well-being and physical health (Chen, Cohen, & Miller, 2010; Miller & 
Chen, 2010), educational opportunities (Dubow, Boxer, & Huesmann, 2009), and social 
mobility (Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins, & Larrimore, 2011). Importantly, understanding how 
social classes differ from each other is not an end unto itself, but rather, provides an 
informational basis upon which individuals can advocate for social change. For example, the 
Occupy Wall Street movement focused on differences between the wealthiest 1% and remaining 
99% of Americans. Using this category distinction, the Occupy movement advocated for 
political and economic reform by calling out meaningful differences between these two 
categories, such as their tax rates, percent share of America’s wealth, and how their average 
incomes have been changing in recent decades (Gitlin, 2012). To summarize, social class 
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categories inform people’s understanding of the current social hierarchy and motivate 
individuals to question the acceptability of social hierarchy in society. 
1.3 Political Ideology Shapes How Individuals Use Social Class Categories to Organize 
Their Worlds and Promote Change and Equality 
 Could ideology predict the use of social class categories? Importantly, because 
motivations to alter the social status quo and promote equality are typically liberal motivations 
(Dunn, 1979; Jost et al., 2013), it follows that liberals may be more motivated than 
conservatives to use social class categories to alter the status quo and promote equality. For 
example, the Occupy movement detailed above espoused predominantly liberal ideologies 
(Gitlin, 2012). In contrast, the same movement drew sharp criticism from many conservative 
pundits like Newt Gingrich, who called the distinction between the 99% and 1% “divisive” and 
“unamerican” (Stelter, 2011). In the following sections, I integrate research and theory on social 
class with that of political ideology, defined formally as a general belief system of preferences 
towards equality and change (Jost et al., 2003; Stern & Ondish, 2018). (Note that “change” in 
this context refers to progressive changes towards what is societally novel rather than 
reactionary change that re-establishes previous norms; Jost et al., 2003; Muller, 2001; Wilson, 
1973.) In doing so, I build the case that liberals are more likely than conservatives to organize 
the world along class lines and use the language of social class to alter the status quo and 
promote equality.  
Past empirical explanations for liberal-conservative disagreements. To understand 
how liberals and conservatives differ in their use of social class categories as an organizing 
principle that informs their social policy attitudes, first consider previous empirical explanations 
for why liberals and conservatives disagree on economic policies that seek to address inequality. 
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That liberal ideologies predict attitudes towards equalizing economic differences is hardly novel 
(e.g., Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Feather, 1985; Furnham, 1982; Griffin & 
Oheneba-Sakyi, 1993; Kluegel, 1990; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Skitka, 1999; Skitka et al., 2002; 
Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Williams, 1984). A more noteworthy investigation asks why do 
liberals and conservatives consistently and spectacularly fail to see eye-to-eye on economic 
policy issues?  
Current research suggests a few possible explanations for why liberals and conservatives 
broadly disagree on policies that seek to address inequality. First, conservatives are more likely 
to make dispositional attributions to explain lower-SES individuals’ economic outcomes (Skitka 
et al., 2002) while liberals are more apt to consider environmental constraints and make 
situational attributions for people's circumstances (Cozzarell et al., 2011; Skitka, 1999; Skitka & 
Tetlock, 1993; Williams, 1984). Second, conservatives may endorse the notion that there are no 
meaningful or systemic differences in how those of different groups (such as those of different 
skin tones) are treated (Chen, LePhuoc, Guzman, Rude, & Dodd, 2006; Neville et al., 2005). 
Ignoring or consciously rejecting that individuals are treated differently based on their category 
membership legitimizes the societal status quo and negates the need for legislation that seeks to 
rectify societal inequality. 
An alternative theory: Ideological differences in the use of social class as an 
organizing principle to understand the world. I propose that in addition to thinking about 
inequality and unequal experiences among individuals as fair and just, an alternative motivated 
perception may involve differences in how individuals use social class categories to organize 
and understand others. As previously outlined, organizing the world along class lines has the 
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potential to give individuals a framework to understand meaningful differences between clusters 
of persons and motivates action to rectify inequality and disrupt the status quo.  
This alternative account is supported by several unique properties of social class as a 
possible organizing category. First, “social class” discourse is deeply rooted in efforts to alter 
the status quo and promote equality (Lukács, 1972). Second, unlike sex and race, social class is 
not represented in one’s genotype or phenotype. That is, social classes are perceived primarily 
through context cues, such as clothing. Thus, while race and sex are inferred rapidly and 
automatically based on physical cues such as facial structure and skin tone (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1989), social classes are perceived relatively imprecisely (Bjornsdottir & Rule, 2017; Kraus, 
Park, & Tan, 2017). The relative ambiguity of social class as a categorical distinction, in turn, 
allows for motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) as to its existence and usefulness. I specifically 
propose that conservatives have a lesser tendency to use class as an organizing feature. On the 
other hand, I propose liberals are more likely to understand and organize others based on 
socially constructed class categories because of the affordances it provides for disrupting the 
status quo and promoting equality. 
1.4 Liberals’ and Conservatives’ Motivations Predict Tendencies to Organize the World 
by Class 
The previous sections outlined a historical account of the origin of social class discourse 
and a theoretical account of why liberals and conservatives may differ in their tendency to 
organize and understand the world with social class categories. Why specifically might those 
ideological differences emerge?  
In line with past research investigating mechanistic explanations of ideological 
differences (e.g., Federico et al., 2005; Golec & Federico, 2004; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; 
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Krosch, Berntsen, Amodio, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013; Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 2013; 2014; 
Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014), I propose that tendencies to organize the world by class 
categories are grounded in liberals’ and conservatives’ motivations. First, I propose that a lesser 
tendency to organize the world along class lines allows one to maintain support for the status 
quo, such as justifying the current societal system and inequality. Second, a lesser tendency to 
organize the world along class lines satisfies epistemic motives for certainty and alleviates the 
ambiguity associated with making class categorizations and the unclear implications of living in 
a class-divided world. A theoretical justification for each of these follows.  
Status quo support.  
System confidence beliefs. First, conservatives may be less likely to see the world 
through a lens of class because conservative ideologies are associated with beliefs that the 
current economic and societal status quo is fair and just (Jost et al., 2003). Acknowledging 
social classes, and by extension systemic differences between them, thus may force one to 
accept that society may not be so fair. As a result, those that are higher in their motives to 
justify the status quo should be less likely to think about the world along class lines. Thus, 
conservatives may be less likely to organize the world with social class categories, because 
acknowledging social classes requires one to accept that systemic inequality exists in society.  
Social dominance orientation (SDO). Second, conservativism is associated with 
motivations to believe that the hierarchical structure of society is natural, just and necessary 
(Sidanius & Pratto 1999). By contrast, the historical purpose of organizing the world through 
social classes has been to understand and then challenge unequal social hierarchies. For 
example, categorizing individuals into social classes may allow individuals to better understand 
and discuss meaningful differences in mortality between those at the top and bottom of the 
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social hierarchy, and then advocate for improved healthcare spending to address this disparity. 
The notion that those high in SDO may be less likely to organize the world along class lines 
dovetails with similar past work showing that those high in SDO tend to perceive the world in a 
way that reduces the need for changes to that hierarchy, such as through perceiving less 
economic inequality (Kteily, Sheehy-Skeffington, & Ho, 2017). By choosing not to organize the 
world through social class categories, conservatives may maintain the current state of affairs 
and hierarchical nature of society itself. Likewise, organizing the world into social classes 
serves liberals’ desires to promote equality.  
Epistemic needs. A lesser tendency to organize the world along class lines could also 
satisfy conservatives’ epistemic motives for order, certainty, and predictability (Jost et al., 2003; 
Jost, Sterling, & Stern, 2018). Motives for order and certainty serve as a “guide and compass” 
for navigating contemporary political and social life (Ball & Dagger, 1991) by seizing on 
judgments that offer efficacy and certainty. Conservatives also tend to have a stronger desire for 
efficient and conclusive reasoning (Chirumbolo, Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2004; 
Van Hiel et al., 2004), whereas liberals show a relative preference for pondering open-ended 
questions that require deep thinking (Sargent, 2004).  
Why might greater epistemic needs predict a lesser tendency to organize and understand 
the world through social class categorizations? First, a lesser tendency to organize the world 
along class lines would relieve one from the tenuous nature of making or applying class 
categorizations based on potentially ambiguous information (Bjornsdottir & Rule, 2017). 
Second, choosing not to organize the world along social class lines relieves one of the 
subsequent unclear implications of living in a class-divided society. For example, if “social 
classes” exist, and so do the systemic differences between them, should they be addressed in 
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some way? If so, is there something that one should do personally? What exactly would be the 
desired alternative outcome? Ignoring social classes quiets a litany of uncertainties and concerns 
about what one (and one’s society as a whole) should do in the face of systemic social 
imbalances that may have no clear or straightforward solutions. 
1.5 A Two-Stage (Motivated Correction) Model of Ideological Differences in the 
Application of Social Class Categorizations  
To understand why liberals and conservatives differ in their tendencies to organize the 
world by social class categories, it is crucial to determine whether liberals and conservatives 
have similar knowledge of social class categories in the first place. There are two distinct 
possibilities for how liberals and conservatives may come to differ in their eventual use of 
social class categories to organize and understand the world.  
The first possibility is that liberals and conservatives differ in their social-class relevant 
knowledge. More specifically, do liberals and conservatives chronically differ in how they 
encode class-relevant stimuli (e.g., status-conveying clothing, attitudes and behaviors associated 
with those at different places in the social hierarchy) and subsequently have different content 
knowledge associated with any social class categories? This seems unlikely for several reasons. 
First, the creation of social categories through perceptions of environmental stimuli and the 
subsequent activation of those categories are relatively fundamental (Allport, 1954; Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Smith & Medin, 1981) and automatic (Devine, 1989; 
Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997) processes. As such, there is often 
large agreement about the beliefs tied to social categories within a culture, even when direct 
contact with members of those social categories is absent (Madon et al., 2001). Indeed, liberals 
and conservatives demonstrate similar knowledge and associations of other social categories 
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such as sex and sexual orientation (Blashill & Powlishta, 2009; Freeman, Johnson, Ambady, & 
Rule, 2010; Herek, 1984; Kite & Deaux, 1987) and race (Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, 
Zuwerick, & Elliot, 1991). It thus follows that liberals and conservatives should have similar 
cultural knowledge about social class categories and experience similar activation of those 
categories in response to relevant stimuli. Second, pilot data suggest that liberals and 
conservatives have similar beliefs about the extent to which traditional class indicators 
determine one’s “social class.” Specifically, participant ideology (1 = Very liberal, 9 = Very 
conservative) did not meaningfully correlate with how important (measured on a 7-pt. scale 
from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much) various factors were for determining an individual’s 
social class. This was found to be the case for income (r(216) = -.003; p = .97 Mimportance = 5.51, 
SD = 1.52), education level (r(216) = -.084, p = .22; Mimportance = 5.05, SD = 1.44), and 
occupational prestige (r(216) = .085, p = .22; Mimportance = 5.03, SD = 1.51). In short, past 
theoretical work and current pilot data converge on the notion that liberals and conservatives 
have similar social class-relevant knowledge. As a result, it is unlikely that ideological 
differences emerge because liberals are more likely to automatically encode social class 
categories and have social class-relevant knowledge.  
The second possibility is that after making initial, automatic categorizations, liberals and 
conservatives differ in how they deliberately “adjustment” their assessments1. This motivated 
correction account of ideological reasoning predicts that liberals and conservatives make the 
same initial social class categorizations but then differ in how they subsequently make effortful, 
motivated adjustments to align their cognitions with their ideological values (Skitka et al., 
                                                 
1 Past research has broadly termed the class of processes by which people avoid using social categories as 





2002). The evidence supporting this account is compelling. Indeed, liberal-conservative 
differences in the tendency to deliberately correct automatic judgments predict individuals’ 
stereotypic beliefs about other groups (Stern et al., 2013), estimated attitudes of ingroup 
members (Stern & West, 2016), and individuals’ attributions of events and behaviors (Skitka et 
al., 2002; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). A motivated reasoning account is compelling for theoretical 
reasons as well. Refraining from utilizing social class categorizations should serve 
conservatives’ 1) motives to maintain the social-hierarchical status quo and 2) epistemic 
motives for certainty. Granted, while most research has focused on effortful corrections on the 
part of liberals, I do not argue that motivated use (or disuse) of social class is a predominantly 
liberal or conservative phenomenon. Indeed, a motivated correction model of ideological 
reasoning suggests that effortful corrections may occur for either liberals or conservatives, so 
long as the initial, automatic assessments fail to align with one’s ideological values/goals. As 
Skitka and colleagues (2002) put: “there is no theoretical reason to believe that liberals ‘own’ 
second-stage reasoning” (pp. 483).  
In summary, it is unlikely that ideological differences in the tendency to organize the 
world along social class lines stem from different latent cultural knowledge of social class, or 
automatic processes between liberals and conservatives in general. It is more theoretically likely 
that liberal-conservative differences in the tendency to organize the world through a lens of 
class result from deliberate “motivated” corrections (e.g., Skitka, 1999; Skitka et al., 2002; 
Stern et al., 2013).  
1.6 The Present Research  
The goal of the present work is to test novel predictions about the ideologically-
dependent use of social class categories during the deliberative process. Additionally, the 
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present work investigates whether differences in how liberals and conservatives think about 
social class shape their policy preferences. More specifically, the present research tests the 
following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1 (Study 1): Conservatives are less likely than liberals to believe social class 
is a useful and informative principle for organizing society.  
Hypothesis 2 (Study 2): Ideological differences in social class category usage stem from 
deliberate adjustments. 
Hypothesis 3 (Studies 3-4): Ideological differences in the belief of social class as an 
organizing principle are motivationally driven. 
Hypothesis 4 (Study 5): Beliefs of social class as a principle to organize and understand 




 CHAPTER 2: STUDY 1 – POLITICAL IDEOLOGY PREDICTS BELIEFS OF SOCIAL 
CLASS AS AN ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE  
The purpose of Study 1 was to establish a foundation for the proposed research by 
broadly demonstrating that political ideology predicts how individuals endorse beliefs that 
social class is a relevant way to organize and understand society. To do this, I created a scale 
intended to broadly tap beliefs of social class categories as an organizing principle for society 
and investigated how these perceptions relate to political ideology. I predicted that liberal 
ideologies would correspond to greater beliefs of social class as an organizing principle.  
2.1 Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 398; MAge = 48.80, SD = 15.00; 63% female) were 
recruited from a Qualtrics panel that equally represented US liberals and conservatives.  
Procedure & measures. 
Political ideology. Political ideology was assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Extremely liberal) to 9 (Extremely conservative), with a midpoint of 5 (Moderate), MIdeology = 
5.11, SD = 2.08. The midpoint of the scale reflected a true “moderate” ideology rather than a 
catch-all for those who have no opinion or are unsure. Both liberals and conservatives are 
typically able to understand and locate their ideology on a single-item measure (Robinson, 
Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991). Consistent with the extant literature, the research captures 
political ideology using a single-item measure. Single-item Likert measures of political 
ideology reliably correlate with many core liberal–conservative differences (Graham et al., 
2009; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Robinson et al., 1991).  
Social class as an organizing principle scale. I created an 8-item scale to capture how 
participants broadly believe “social class” is an informative and useful way to understand and 
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organize society (see Table 1). Items used a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly 
Disagree), where higher scores corresponding to greater beliefs of social class as an organizing 
principle (MSCOP = 4.67, SD = 1.16).  
2.2 Results 
 Preliminary results. To ensure adequate psychometric properties of the newly 
developed SCOP scale, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with oblique rotation. 
Oblique rotation allows for a more restrictive analysis than orthogonal rotation when the scale’s 
underlying factors are correlated (Costello & Osborne, 2005)2. Specifically, the CFA employed 
Direct Oblimin, which uses a more restrictive calculation method than Promax. Note that 
several types of oblique rotations exist, yet tend to yield comparable results (Kim and Mueller, 
1978).  
  The component matrix revealed two factors. Factor 1 had an eigenvalue of 3.60 and 
accounted for 45.0% of the total variance, while Factor 2 had an eigenvalue of 1.55 and 
accounted for an additional 19.4% of the variance. The correlation between the two factors was 
approximately .30. 
Although the CFA results supported a two-factor structure, I argue that a unidimensional 
structure better accounts for SCOP beliefs. First, all of the factors adequately loaded onto a 
primary factor at a satisfactory threshold (>.40). Second, item loadings indicated that Factor 2 
was composed of only the reverse-scored items, which likely merely represents an artifact in the 
questions rather than a distinct theoretical construct (Spector, Van Katwyk, Brannick, & Chen, 
1997). Others have noted that while reverse-scored items might add a layer of nuance to how 
participants respond to scales, they do not necessitate decomposition into multiple subscales 
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, oblique and orthogonal rotational analyses yielded nearly identical results.  
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(Cordery & Sevastos, 1993; Idaszak & Drasgow, 1987; Schmitt & Stults, 1985). Third, the eight 
SCOP items showed strong internal consistency (α = .82). In short, there was sufficient 
theoretical and statistical evidence that the SCOP scale is assessing a single unidimensional 
construct. I thus averaged the items into a single composite.  
Correlation with ideology.  As predicted, the SCOP scale significantly correlated with 
political ideology, r(398) = -.373, p < .0013, such that more liberal ideologies predicted greater 
beliefs that social class categories are useful and informative ways to understand and organize 
society.  
2.3 Discussion 
In a highly-powered investigation, Study 1 found strong evidence that political ideology 
predicts SCOP beliefs. Specifically, greater liberalism predicted greater beliefs that social class 
is a useful and informative way to organize and understand society.  
Nevertheless, it is worth discussing some possible limitations of the proposed scale. 
Some psychological researchers have raised questions about the use of explicit and potentially 
“charged” questions that may elicit social desirability concerns (Paulhus, 1984). However, 
recent meta-analyses on explicit attitude measurement suggest that explicit questions that use 
direct language correlate more with implicit attitudes than explicit questions that use indirect 
language, suggesting that participants are generally honest about even potentially controversial 
attitudes and that social desirability concerns in explicit attitudes may be overstated (Axt, 2018). 
A related concern is that perhaps the historical and social connotations of social class (e.g., 
Marxism and contemporary liberal/university discussion about social class differences) may 
                                                 
3 When analyzed separately, political ideology was still significantly correlated with both the three reverse-scored 
items, r = -.20, p < .001, and the five non-reverse scored items, r = -.38, p < .001.  
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stoke conservative ire for social class categories. However, how ideological belief systems 
foster different tendencies to think about and use social class categories in contemporary 
discourse is a core feature of the present research. As such, using lay, context-relevant language 




CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2 – SOCIAL COGNITION AND CLASS CATEGORY 
ORGANIZATION  
Study 2 had two main purposes. First, to investigate whether liberals and conservatives 
differ in their tendencies to use social class categories as a way to organize and understand the 
world because of differences in automatic or controlled cognitive processes (Skitka et al., 2002). 
In line with a two-stage motivated correction account, I predicted that liberals and conservatives 
experience similar social class category activation during judgments. However, I proposed that 
liberals and conservatives diverge in their deliberate use of social class categories, suggesting 
that ideological differences result from “motivated corrections.” Second, Study 2 expanded the 
scope of Study 1 by investigating liberal-conservative differences in the use of class as an 
organizing principle specifically in the context of interpersonal perception. 
3.1 Method  
Study 2 utilized two measures. First, to capture automatic categorizations, I adapted the 
“Who Said What?” paradigm (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978) for online 
administration (e.g., Petersen, 2012). This paradigm has been widely used to assess automatic 
category activation (e.g., Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; Spears & Haslam, 1997; Stangor, 
& McMillan, 1992; Taylor & Falcone, 1982). Second, to capture the deliberate application of 
social class categorizations, I utilized a descriptor selection task that asked participants to 
explicitly describe a target individual.  
In Study 2 (as well as Studies 3, 4, and 5), all hypotheses, measures, analytic methods, 
sample size, and exclusion criteria were pre-registered at aspredicted.org. See Appendix A for 
all study pre-registration plans.  
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Participants. Participants (N = 316; Mage = 38.31, SD = 12.44; 52.5% female) were 
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Liberals and conservatives on Mechanical Turk 
closely mirror the psychological profiles of liberals and conservatives in the general population 
(Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015). This sample size was determined using G*Power 
statistical software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). I calculated that a small 
interaction effect (f2 =.02), with α = .05 and β = .80, would require approximately 310 
observations. 
Procedure & measures. Participants proceeded through a Qualtrics survey consisting 
of an automatic categorization and a deliberate selection task. I describe each below.  
Automatic (“Who Said What?”) task. 
 Procedure. To measure automatic social class category activation, participants first 
completed a “Who Said What?” paradigm adapted for online use. The automatic task proceeded 
in the following three phases:  
First, participants saw photos of target individuals paired with statements that each 
target had supposedly made. Participants were instructed to form an impression of the target 
individuals. This procedure utilized three photos of upper-class individuals and three photos of 
working-class individuals. People saw 18 trails. Each photo was paired with three different 
statements. Participants saw each statement-photo pair for five seconds before automatically 
proceeding to the next trial.  
Second, participants completed a distraction task to increase the error rates (Lieberman 
et al., 2008; Stangor et al., 1992). Specifically, participants had 60 seconds to list as many of the 
50 US states as possible. 
23 
 
Third, participants saw each of the previous 18 statements individually and tried to 
match each statement with the correct individual that had made that statement. 
Score calculation. Similar to past research utilizing the “Who Said What?” paradigm, I 
calculated the number of within-category errors (i.e., mistaking the quote of an individual as 
being said by someone from the same social class) and between-category errors (i.e., mistaking 
the quote of an individual as being said by someone from a different social class). The rationale 
behind this methodology is that participants who encode social class category information 
should be more prone to make within-category errors. I then computed the difference between 
within-category errors and between-category errors, with a (2/3) correction to account for the 
fact that participants were 1/3 more likely to make between category errors by pure statistical 
chance, given that there were three possible photos that represent between category errors, but 
only two that represent within category errors (Taylor et al., 1978). Similar to past research, I 
ignored correct responses because one cannot determine if the perceiver knew the correct 
answer or merely guessed correctly. The outcome was calculated as (within category errors - 
(2/3)*between category errors)4 (M = 2.13, SD = 2.51).  
Deliberate selection task. Immediately following the “Who Said What?” task, 
participants completed a deliberate selection task.  
Procedure. Participants were shown the same six photos from the “Who Said What?” 
task, presented one at a time, in tandem with a bank of descriptors. The bank consisted of 
descriptors from possible “areas” that involved social class, social categories such as sex and 
                                                 
4 Note that in the pre-registration plan, this term was originally calculated as (within category errors / 
(2/3)*between category errors). However, a small number of participants made 0 between category errors, thus 
making this value impossible to calculate. As a result, I instead calculated the automatic activation score as the 
difference between within and between category errors (e.g., Kurzban et al., 2001; Petersen, 2012). 
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race, personality, and other physical characteristics (see Table 2). Participants were instructed to 
select up to 5 descriptors from the bank to describe the target individual.  
Score calculation. The outcome measure was the total number of target photos that 
participants described using social class descriptors. Scores ranged from 0 to 6 (with M = 3.21, 
SD = 2.00).  
Stimuli selection for automatic and deliberate tasks.  
Photo selection. Target photos were selected based on a pilot-study of N = 250 
participants from Mechanical Turk that investigated the perceptions of eight working class and 
eight upper class photos. I selected a final three working class and three upper class photos from 
this pool based on several criteria. See Table 3 for photo pilot data. 
First, I chose photos based on the interrater reliability of perceived social-class category 
(“If you had to categorize this individual's social class, which label would you choose to give 
them?”) with options of lower class, working class, middle class, and upper class. I only 
selected photos with high interrater reliability (>75% agreement) for the final stimuli materials. 
Importantly, photos were also selected such that participant political ideology (1= Very liberal, 
9 = Very conservative) did not meaningfully correlate with target photos’ perceived social class 
(1 = predicted social class label selected, 0 = other social class label selected), all rs < .18. 
Second, the pilot study tested for cofounding peripheral differences between upper class 
and working class photos. Specifically, I measured perceptions of photo quality (1= Very low 
quality, 7 = Very high quality), lighting (1 = Very bad, 7 = Very good), and difficulty to 
perceive the target individual (1= Not at all difficult, 7 = Very difficult). I aggregated these 
peripheral perception ratings into an overall quality composite (all αs > .80). I then selected 
photos to minimize any differences in overall photo quality, such that the effect size of the mean 
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difference in quality score between the final three upper class and working class conditions was 
small (average d = .11).  
Statement selection. Eighteen target statements (Table 4) were selected from a bank of 
68 via a pilot study of N = 250 Mechanical Turk participants. I selected statements based on the 
following criteria. 
First, I tested the perceived social class typicality of each statement (e.g., “please 
indicate the extent to which you believe the statement is more true of the types of things that 
working class or upper class people would typically say or think”; 1 = More true of working 
class people, 7 = more true of upper class people). I specifically selected statements that did not 
meaningfully differ from the scale midpoint (effect size r <.10). Class-neutral statements were 
essential for the automatic categorizations task to ensure any unconscious social class category 
activation was attributable to the photos and not the statements. I additionally tested that 
participant political ideology did not meaningfully correlate (r < .10) with perceived social class 
typicality because any ideological differences in perceived social class typicality could produce 
confounding liberal-conservative differences in unconscious social class activation.  
Second, I also tested the perceived ideological typicality of each statement (e.g., “please 
indicate the extent to which you believe the statement is more true of the types of things that 
liberals or conservatives would typically say or think”; 1 = More true of liberals, 7 = more true 
of conservatives). I specifically selected statements with the 1) the smallest effect sizes of 
relative to the scale midpoint, and 2) the smallest effect sizes of perceived ideological typicality 
with participant political ideology. For more details about the photo and statement selection, 
please see Appendix A. 
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Political ideology. Political ideology was assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Extremely liberal) to 9 (Extremely conservative), M = 4.85, SD = 2.44.  
3.2 Results  
Main analysis: Automatic activation and deliberate social class usage. The main 
analysis drew a direct comparison between how liberals and conservatives differed in their 
activation of social class categories (in the automatic task) relative to how they used social class 
categories to describe others (in the deliberate task). I conducted the analysis using a linear 
model using the MIXED procedure in SPSS. The fixed effects in the model were 1) participant 
ideology, 2) task type (-1 = automatic, +1 = deliberate), and 3) an Ideology × Task Type 
interaction. I included participant as a random intercept. The outcome measure was the 
participants’ task score.  
There was a significant Ideology × Task Type interaction, b = -0.19, 95% CI = [-0.36, -
0.01], t(628) = -2.08, p = .038, indicating that task type moderated the relationship between 
political ideology and participants’ task score. A simple slopes analysis looking specifically 
within the automatic task revealed no significant effect of political ideology, b = 0.05, 95% CI = 
[-0.20, 0.30], t(628) = 0.37, p = .71, suggesting that liberals and conservatives experience 
similar activation of social class categories during interpersonal perception. A simple slopes 
analysis looking specifically within the deliberate task revealed the hypothesized significant 
effect of political ideology, b = -0.33, 95% CI = [-0.58, -0.08], t(628) = -2.57, p = .010, 
suggesting greater political conservativism corresponded with less social class usage (Figure 1).  
Is it possible that liberals simply used more social categories in general? To examine this 
question, I formally tested whether liberals differed significantly more than conservatives in 
their usage of social category descriptors than individuating descriptors. To do this, I calculated 
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each participant’s deliberate social category descriptor usage by summing all social category 
terms (from the areas of: sex, race, age, citizenship, military status, bodily ability, religion, and 
sexual orientation) used the describe the six photos. Likewise, I calculated the deliberate 
individuating descriptor usage (from the areas of: leadership quality, physical attributes, 
friendliness, work ethic, sincerity, attractiveness, and emotions) used to describe the six photos. 
The analysis used the MIXED procedure in SPSS. The fixed effects in the model were 1) 
participant ideology, 2) descriptor type (effect coded as -1 = deliberate social category 
descriptor usage, +1 = deliberate individuating descriptor usage), and 3) an Ideology × 
Descriptor Type interaction. Participant was included as a random intercept. The outcome 
measure was participants’ social category and individuating descriptor usage.   
There was a significant main effect of descriptor type, b = -2.13, 95% CI = [-2.50, -
1.76], t(628) = -11.23, p < .001, indicating that on average, participants used more social 
category descriptors than individuating descriptors. However, there was no significant Ideology 
× Descriptor Type interaction, b = -0.14, 95% CI = [-0.51, 0.23], t(628) = -0.73, p = .47), 
indicating that liberals did not differ more than conservatives in their tendency to use social 
categories in general. See Figure 2 for additional descriptor frequencies.  
Secondary analysis: Automatic activation and deliberate work ethic descriptor 
usage. The secondary analysis investigated whether liberals and conservatives differed more in 
their deliberate work ethic descriptor usage than in their automatic activation of social class 
categories. To do this, I calculated the sum of all work ethic descriptors used to describe the six 
photos. This analysis used the MIXED procedure in SPSS. The fixed effects in the model were 
1) participant ideology, 2) task type (-1 = automatic, +1 = deliberate work ethic descriptor 
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usage) and 3) an Ideology × Task Type interaction. Participant was included as a random 
intercept. The outcome measure was the participants’ task score.  
There was no significant Political Ideology × Task Type interaction, b = 0.08, 95% CI = 
[-0.09, 0.24], t(628) = -0.92, p = .36, indicating that liberals and conservatives did not differ 
more in their deliberate work ethic descriptor usage than in their automatic activation score.  
3.3 Discussion  
As predicted, Study 2 found that liberals and conservatives did not differ in their 
automatic activation of social class categories, but did differ in how they deliberately used 
social class categories to describe others. Importantly, this finding suggests that liberals and 
conservatives experienced similar activation of social class categories on an unconscious level, 
but differed in how they subsequently used social class to describe others deliberately. Thus, 
ideological differences in the tendency to organize the world into social class categories 
theoretically align with past research of dual-process “adjustment” models of motivated 
corrections (e.g., Skitka, 1999; Skitka et al., 2002, Stern et al., 2013). Furthermore, a follow-up 
analysis revealed that this effect was not attributable to liberals simply over-using social 
categories in general.  
A planned secondary analysis also investigated whether political ideology predicted the 
use of work ethic terms to describe working class and upper class individuals relative to their 
automatic category activation. However, this was not the case, suggesting that differences in 





CHAPTER 4: STUDY 3 – LIBERALS’ AND CONSERVATIVES’ MOTIVATIONS AS 
MECHANISMS FOR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN BELIEFS OF SOCIAL 
CLASS AS AN ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE  
Why do liberal-conservative differences in the tendency to organize and describe the 
world along class lines exist? Study 3 examined whether ideological differences in social class 
beliefs are motivationally driven by 1) system confidence beliefs, 2) preferences for hierarchy, 
and 3) epistemic needs.  
4.1 Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 474; Mage = 39.27, SD = 13.87; 50% female) were 
recruited from a Qualtrics recruiting service that equally represented US liberals and 
conservatives. I conducted an analysis to determine the sample size needed to detect the weakest 
indirect path at 80% power, α = .05. This was done using a script in R that estimated the chance 
of detecting significant pathways in a specified mediation model across 1000 simulated 
samples, based on inputted standardized paths. The estimated relationship between ideology (X) 
and SDO (M1) was .38 (Ho et al., 2015); the estimated relationship between ideology (X) and 
system confidence beliefs (M2) was .36 (Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012); the estimated 
relationship between ideology (X) and epistemic needs (M3) was .20 (Jost, Sterling, & Stern, 
2018); the relationship between all mediators and the SCOP scale (Y) was .15 (a cautious 
estimation).  
Procedure & measures. Participants completed an online survey with the following 
measures.   
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Social class as an organizing principle (SCOP) scale. The use of social class categories 
to organize and understand society was measured using the 8-item scale designed in Study 1 (α 
= .77; M = 4.47, SD = 1.12).  
System confidence beliefs. System confidence beliefs were measured with the General 
System Confidence Beliefs (Kay & Jost, 2003) scale, which contains eight items such as “In 
general, I find society to be fair” (α = .78; M = 4.63, SD = 1.45).  
Social dominance orientation. Motivational preferences for hierarchy were measured 
via the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Ho et al., 2015) scale, a 16-item self-report 
measure with items such as, “Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place” (α = .87, M = 
2.85, SD = 1.05). Note that system confidence and social dominance orientation may be difficult 
to disentangle because in most countries the system status quo is hierarchically structured 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), yet, empirical and theoretical work suggest these two scales do tap 
theoretically distinct constructs (Brandt & Reyna, 2017).  
Epistemic needs. Epistemic needs were measured through the Tolerance of Ambiguity 
scale (Herman, Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 2010), which is adapted from Budner’s 
(1962) Intolerance to Ambiguity scale. The scale contains 12 items, such as “I like parties 
where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are strangers.” 
Like Budner’s original scale, the Tolerance to Ambiguity scale taps a single, general dimension 
of one’s tolerance to ambiguity (Furnham & Marks, 2013). This is preferable to either a multi-
factor construct or a contextually specific rendering that may have too much theoretical overlap 
with political ideology. In addition, Herman’s scale improves upon Budner’s commonly-used 
scale by dropping and adding items to increase internal consistency (Herman et al., 2010). 
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Indeed, large-sample analyses suggest that Herman et al.’s Tolerance to Ambiguity scale has 
adequate internal consistency (α = .73).5  
Political ideology. Political ideology was assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Extremely liberal) to 9 (Extremely conservative), Mideology = 5.02, SD = 2.45. 
4.2 Results 
The analysis was a statistical mediation using Model 4 of the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2012), with 5,000 bias corrected bootstraps. I specified a model with ideology as the 
independent variable and mediators of social dominance orientation, system confidence beliefs, 
and epistemic needs. The outcome measure was SCOP beliefs. See Table 5 for the zero-order 
correlations amongst the variables.  
The indirect effect through SDO was statistically significant, ab = -.05, 95% CI = [-.07, -
.03]. Specifically, more conservative ideologies predicted greater SDO, which subsequently 
predicted lesser SCOP beliefs (Figure 3). The indirect effect of system confidence beliefs, ab = 
.00, 95% CI = [-.02, .01], and tolerance to ambiguity, ab = -.01, 95% CI = [-.02, .00] failed to 
achieve significance at the α = .05 level. Taken together, these findings suggest that liberals 
were more likely to endorse beliefs of social class as an organizing principle, at least in part 
because of their relatively lower social dominance motivations. However, system confidence 
beliefs and epistemic needs failed to uniquely explain variability in SCOP beliefs between 
liberals and conservatives after accounting for social dominance orientation.  
 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, the Tolerance to Ambiguity scale failed to show adequate internal consistency, (α = .50). I 
increased the internal consistency from .50 to .54 by removing two items. The 12-item and 10-item composites of 
the tolerance to ambiguity measure yielded nearly identical results in the main analysis. As such, the main analysis 




4.3 Discussion  
  Study 3 replicated the relationship between ideology and SCOP beliefs observed in 
Study 1. In addition, Study 3 found that liberals and conservatives may differ in their SCOP 
beliefs primarily due to ideological differences in motivations to support hierarchy. 
Specifically, lesser motivations for hierarchy predicted elevated SCOP beliefs. This finding is 
congruent with a cultural perspective suggesting that social class categories have historically 
functioned in Western society as vehicles to promote change and equality. By contrast, 
motivational preferences for hierarchy predicted lesser SCOP beliefs, suggesting that for those 
who wish to maintain hierarchy, social class categories are a less desirable way to organize and 
understand society. Nevertheless, political ideology predicted both system confidence and 
epistemic needs, each of which predicted SCOP beliefs. Thus, while motivations to uphold 
hierarchy best explained ideological differences in SCOP beliefs, system confidence and 
epistemic needs may be nevertheless by psychologically meaningful determinants of social 
class beliefs as well. Taken together, Study 3 supported the over-arching hypothesis that 
ideological differences in the tendency to organize and understand society through social class 





CHAPTER 5: STUDY 4 – EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT FOR MOTIVATED BELIEFS 
OF SOCIAL CLASS AS AN ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE  
 The first goal of Study 4 was to replicate the results of past studies by investigating the 
relationship between political ideology and beliefs of social class as a useful and informative 
organizing principle. The second goal was to experimentally examine whether ideological 
differences in the tendency to organize society with social class are motivationally driven. To do 
this, Study 4 assessed SCOP beliefs in a self-relevant (US) or self-irrelevant (Canada) context.  
5.1 Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 393) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(Mage = 40.14, SD = 13.03; 56.5% female). The sample size was determined with a power 
analysis conducted in G*Power statistical software (Faul et al., 2007) to determine the target N 
for a sufficiently powered of a small effect (f2 = .02) at 80% power, α = .05. 
Procedure & measures. Participants responded to the following items in a survey 
hosted by Qualtrics. 
SCOP scale for the US and Canada. Participants completed the SCOP scale from 
Studies 1 and 3 with the items contextualized in a self-relevant (US) or irrelevant (Canada) 
system (e.g., Krosch et al., 2013). For example, in the self-relevant system condition, 
participants read items such as “Talking about ‘social class’ in the United States is 
unnecessary,” and “People who go on about ‘social classes’ in the United States are just looking 
for something to complain about.” In the irrelevant system condition, participants read items 
such as “Talking about ‘social class’ in Canada is unnecessary,” and “People who go on about 




Identification with country. I also assessed the extent to which participants felt that the 
target country was relevant to them. To tap these perceptions, I used a 6-item scale adapted 
from the Group Identification Scale (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995), which contained items 
such as “I have spent time trying to find out more about the United States [Canada], such as its 
history, traditions, and customs” and “I feel strong ties with people in the United States 
[Canada]”, (αUS = .86, αCanada = .88)
6. See Table 6 for the full item list.  
Perceptions of inequality. Participants reported their perceptions of inequality with a 
question that asked participants to compare the annual incomes of the top 20% and bottom 20% 
of income earners for the target country (Chambers, Swan, & Heesacker, 2014). Specifically, 
after a short introduction to ensure participants understood the task, participants were asked of 
the target country “How many times greater is the income of the top 20% of earners, on 
average, compared to the bottom 20% of earners?” Answers were right-skewed, with one 
extreme outlier in the Canada condition (Cook’s distance = 545.9) and US condition (Cook’s 
distance = 8849.3). After removing these two extreme outliers, all other responses were within 
the range of acceptable influence (Cook’s distances < .15). These responses (MUS = 156.45, SDUS 
= 227.50; MCanada = 74.36, SDCanada = 190.17) were standardized prior to analysis.  
Political ideology. Political ideology was assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Extremely liberal) to 9 (Extremely conservative), M = 4.62, SD = 2.43.  
5.2 Results  
Main analysis. The analysis was a linear regression model with independent variables 
consisting of 1) participant ideology, 2) target country (effect coded as US = -1, Canada = +1), 
                                                 
6 Additionally, a confirmatory factor analysis with oblique rotation resulted in one extracted factor. All items 





and 3) an Ideology × Target Country interaction. The outcome measure was participants’ SCOP 
beliefs for the target country.  
There was a significant main effect of target country, b = -0.22, 95% CI = [-0.33, -0.10], 
t(389) = -3.58, p < .001, such that participants on average indicated greater SCOP beliefs for the 
US, b = 5.17, 95% CI = [5.01, 5.34] than for Canada, b = 4.74, 95% CI = [4.57, 4.90]. The 
analysis also revealed a significant main effect of political ideology, b = -0.33, 95% CI = [-0.44, 
-0.21], t(389) = -5.39, p < .001, suggesting that across both conditions, conservative ideologies 
predicted greater SCOP beliefs. However, there was no significant Target Country × Political 
Ideology interaction, b = 0.02, 95% CI = [-.09, .14], t(389) = 0.40, p = .69, suggesting that 
political ideology predicted SCOP beliefs similarly in the US and Canada conditions. 
Secondary analysis. I also conducted a secondary analysis that regressed SCOP beliefs 
on the same independent variables from the main analysis, with the addition of 1) perceptions of 
inequality, 2) identification with country, and 3) each’s interaction with target country (Table 
7). This analysis similarly revealed no significant Target Country × Political Ideology 
interaction, b = 0.07, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.20], t(384) = 1.02, p = .31, suggesting that even when 
controlling for perceptions of inequality and identification with country, political ideology 
predicted SCOP beliefs similarly for the US and Canada. 
5.3 Discussion  
The findings of Study 4 replicated the previous studies by revealing that liberals endorse 
greater beliefs of social class as an organizing principle than conservatives. However, Study 4 
found that the relationship between political ideology and SCOP beliefs were not shaped by 
target country, even when accounting for perceptions of inequality and identification with 
country. Thus, Study 4 cannot provide experimental support for the hypothesis that ideological 
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differences in social class beliefs are motivationally driven. This finding is at odds with past 
research (e.g., Krosch et al. 2013) showing that self-irrelevant contexts (e.g., Canada) attenuate 
US liberals’ and conservatives’ system justifying motivations. Rather, to the extent that liberals’ 
and conservatives’ social class beliefs are motivationally driven (Study 3), the present findings 
suggest that the US and Canada conditions were similarly self-relevant. See the General 





CHAPTER 6: STUDY 5 – BELIEFS OF SOCIAL CLASS AS AN ORGANIZING 
PRINCIPLE PREDICT LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE DIFFERENCES IN POLICY 
ATTITUDES  
Study 5 examined the downstream consequence of liberals’ tendency to organize and 
understand the world with social class categories. Marx originally hypothesized that “class 
awareness” would eventually upend capitalism and promote a classless society (Marx & Engels, 
1848). Although most contemporary individuals may not advocate for such radical change, 
organizing the world into social class categories may facilitate preferences for legislation that 
aims to reduce socioeconomic inequality. By contrast, a lesser tendency to organize the world 
with social class categories may facilitate attitudes that there is little need for redistributive 
social policies. This follows for several reasons. First, thinking categorically about social others 
emphasizes fundamental differences between groups (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Ryazanov & 
Christenfeld, 2018), which motivates action to reduce inequality (McCall et al., 2017). Second, 
social class categories provide an informational basis upon which individuals can advocate for 
change (e.g., the 99% vs. the 1%; Stelter, 2011). Thus, Study 5 tested the hypothesis that beliefs 
of social class as an organizing principle partly explain the relationship between ideology and 
social policies that promote equality.   
6.1 Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 415) were recruited from a Qualtrics paneling service 
(Mage = 40.54 SD = 14.03; 50.4% female). This sample size was determined using a script in R 
that estimated the chance of detecting significant pathways at 80% power, α =.05, in a 
mediation model across 1000 simulated samples, based on inputted standardized paths. The 
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estimated relationship between ideology (X) and the SCOP scale (M) was .37 (Study 1); the 
relationship between the SCOP scale and policy attitudes (Y) was .15 (a cautious guess).  
Procedure & measures. Participants completed the following items in a survey hosted 
by Qualtrics. 
SCOP beliefs. The use of social class categories to organize and understand society was 
measured using the SCOP scale from Studies 1, 3, and 4 (α = .77, M = 4.34, SD = 1.15). 
Attitudes towards hierarchy attenuating social policy. Participants reported their 
attitudes towards economic and social policies intended to reduce inequality. These items were 
originally adapted from the of the General Social Survey (GSS; Smith, Marsden, & Hout, 2017) 
and used by past researchers specifically to understand attitudes towards policies that might 
attenuate the social hierarchy (Zimmerman & Reyna, 2013). The scale contains 11 questions 
such as “The government should provide more chances for children from poor families to go to 
college” (α = .77; M = 3.58, SD = .84; Table 8). 
Political ideology. Political ideology was assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Extremely liberal) to 9 (Extremely conservative), Mideology = 5.06, SD = 2.55. 
6.2 Results 
 I examined whether SCOP beliefs explained in part why liberals were more likely to 
support hierarchy attenuating social policies. I used Model 4 of the PROCESS macro in SPSS 
(Hayes, 2012), with 5,000 bias-corrected bootstraps. I specified a model with ideology as the 
independent variable, SCOP beliefs as the mediator variable, and hierarchy attenuating social 
policy attitudes as the outcome variable. 
Political ideology significantly predicted SCOP beliefs, which in turn predicted policy 
attitudes (Table 9). The total indirect effect of political ideology on policy attitudes was 
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significant, ab = -0.06, 95% CI = [-0.08, -0.04], suggesting that liberals reported greater 
hierarchy-attenuating social policy attitudes in part because they hold greater SCOP beliefs 
(Figure 4). 
6.3 Discussion 
Study 5 tested an important, but currently unexamined reason for why liberals and 
conservatives disagree on economic policies intended to reduce inequality. In line with my 
hypothesis, Study 5 found 1) that liberals and conservatives differ in their attitudes towards 
hierarchy attenuating social policies, and 2) that policy attitude differences were partially 




CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Why do liberals and conservatives consistently fail to see eye-to-eye on economic and 
social policies, such as the ones that aim to address rising economic inequality? The present 
work took the novel approach of connecting a historical, cultural perspective on the origin of the 
Western notion of “social class” (e.g., Marx & Engels, 1848) with contemporary psychological 
research on liberals’ and conservatives’ motivations (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Pratto et al., 1994). 
By marrying these different perspectives, the present research finds that liberals and 
conservatives may disagree on social policies, in part, because they construct fundamentally 
different understandings of society. Specifically, liberals and conservatives differ in how they 
use social class categories to organize and understand society, which in turn shapes their social 
policy attitudes.  
7.1 Summary of Results  
Study 1 found that political ideology predicted SCOP beliefs, such that greater amounts 
of conservativism corresponded with lesser beliefs that social class categories are a useful and 
informative way to organize and understand society. Study 2 then investigated where in the 
social-cognitive process liberals and conservatives disagree in their SCOP beliefs. Results 
suggested that liberals and conservatives had similar mental representations of social class 
categories (as measured by automatic category activation), but differed in how they make 
deliberate adjustments (e.g., Skitka et al., 2002) in the application of social class category 
information during interpersonal perceptions. Studies 3 and 4 investigated whether ideological 
differences in SCOP beliefs were motivationally driven. To this end, Study 3 found that 
motivational preferences for hierarchy explained the relationship between political ideology and 
SCOP beliefs. Specifically, conservative ideologies predicted greater social dominance 
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orientation, which subsequently predicted a lesser tendency to organize and understand the 
world through social class categories. Study 4 experimentally investigated whether ideological 
differences in SCOP beliefs were motivationally driven, but found, contrary to my hypothesis, 
that political ideology predicted SCOP beliefs in both the self-relevant (US) and irrelevant 
(Canada) conditions. Finally, Study 5 investigated whether liberals’ and conservatives’ SCOP 
beliefs were consequential to their social policy attitudes and found that beliefs of social class as 
an organizing principle partially explained the relationship between political ideology and 
attitudes towards social policies intended to promote equality.  
7.2 Unexpected Findings  
One unexpected finding that deserves mention is that the target system in Study 4 (US 
vs. Canada) did not shape liberal-conservative differences in SCOP beliefs. One explanation for 
this is that both the US and Canada conditions were relevant to the self, thus similarly shaping 
SCOP beliefs in each condition7. There are several reasons why this may have been the case. 
First, the US and Canada are both westernized, democratic societies and have relatively similar 
cultures (comparatively speaking). As a result, the US social system could have been salient in 
the Canada condition because to the extent that social classes are a meaningful principle for 
understanding Canada, they could, by implication, be similarly meaningful for the US. As a 
result, any attitudes about social classes in Canada may have directly implicated the US as well. 
Second, the US social system could have been salient in the Canada condition because US 
participants were likely very unfamiliar with the social and economic nuances of Canada, and 
                                                 
7 Study 4’s methodology was adapted from Krosch et al. (2013), who manipulated the saliency of the 
American social system by presenting target individuals as American or Canadian during an interpersonal 
perception task. Thus, their Canadian condition made no mention of the American social system at all. By contrast, 
the Canadian SCOP questions in Study 4 may have made the US social system salient, thus activating system-




faced with an obfuscating assessment, simply used their US SCOP beliefs to inform their 
perceptions of Canada. This second explanation is attractive because if participants were 
relatively uncertain about Canada, one might predict that Canadian SCOP beliefs would score 
closer to the scale midpoint (Presser, & Schuman, 1980) relative to US SCOP beliefs. 
Supporting this explanation, SCOP beliefs in the Canada condition were closer to the scale 
midpoint than those in the US condition. Furthermore, this difference remained even when 
accounting for country identification and perceptions of inequality. 
How then might future studies experimentally investigate if SCOP beliefs are 
motivationally driven? Motivated beliefs may be manipulated in numerous other ways (Jost, 
2018), for example, by providing threats to those beliefs and subsequently compelling 
individuals to defend them (e.g., Jost et al., 2005, Study 3; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005). For 
example, the relationship between political ideology and SCOP beliefs may be altered in an 
experimental manipulation that casts doubt on the validity of the participant’s socioeconomic 
system (e.g., Kay et al., 2005). Under such conditions, conservative motivations to support 
hierarchy should be more salient, resulting in reactionary decreases in SCOP beliefs. On the 
other hand, casting doubt on the validity of the socioeconomic system should activate liberal 
motivations for change and equality, thus increasing SCOP beliefs.  
7.3 Integration with Current Theories 
Liberals’ and conservatives’ policy attitudes. Why do liberals and conservatives often 
disagree on economic policies? Ideological differences in policy attitudes have been attributed 
to liberal-conservative differences in attributions (Skitka et al., 2002), “moral” underpinnings 
(Graham et al., 2009), and cognitive rigidity (Jost et al., 2003). Building on and integrating a 
broad literature on liberals’ and conservatives’ motivations (Carney et al., 2008; Jost, et al., 
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2008; Kahan, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006), the present research also suggests that liberals and 
conservatives have different policy attitudes in part because they construct different 
understandings of society based on social class categories. Specifically, one source of policy 
disagreement is that liberals are more likely (and conservatives less likely) to organize and 
understand the society with social class categories. 
One implication of the finding that SCOP beliefs predict liberal-conservative policy 
disagreements is that it may be possible to promote agreement in economic policies by creating 
interventions that inform individuals about the existence of social class categories in the US. 
Both US liberals and conservatives drastically under-estimate inequality (Kraus, 2015; Kraus & 
Tan, 2015), and as a result, interventions that can accurately inform individuals about the 
current state of US economic affairs are timely. Fortunately, interventions that inform 
individuals about economic inequality in the US can increase support for redistributive social 
policies (McCall et al., 2017). However, the specific terminology and language of messages can 
powerfully shape the intervention success rates, especially when deeply held beliefs, such 
political values, are involved (Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Gromet, Kunreuther, & Larrick, 2013). 
Conservatives seem more averse than liberals to the language of “social class.” However, 
conversations of inequality almost invariably necessitate creating social class categories, as 
these category distinctions are the bases of many economic comparisons (e.g., Norton & Ariely, 
2011). Thus, future interventions should consider the specific language used to describe social 
class categories (e.g., “working class vs. upper class”, “top 20%” vs. “bottom 20%”) to 
maximize intervention effectiveness.  
Importantly, even small differences in public opinion can translate into meaningful 
influences in society (Prentice & Miller, 1992), especially in the case of winner-take-all 
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political elections and referendums, where even narrow margins of victory can shape drastic, 
systemic social changes. Thus, if liberals and conservatives can agree on the extent that social 
class categories are useful and informative ways to organize and understand their economic 
worlds, it may yield potent outcomes for legislative attempts to reduce economic inequality. 
Cognitive styles and motivated reasoning.  The present findings are also relevant for a 
growing body of research investigating the relationship between political ideology and social 
category usage (e.g., Stern et al., 2013). This current literature broadly suggests that 
conservatives rely more than liberals on social categories during interpersonal judgments. For 
example, conservatives tend to more rigidly rely on category usage with respect sexual 
orientation, race, gender, sex, and even fictional groups (Stern, 2019; Stern et al., 2013; 2015; 
Stern & Rule, 2019). Ideological differences in social category usage may stem from 
fundamental differences in cognitive processing styles of liberals and conservatives 
(Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). For example, conservatives, relative to 
liberals, are less tolerant of ambiguity and complexity (Jost et al., 2013; Sidanius, 1978) and 
show stronger preferences for certainty and closure (Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon 1999). As a 
result, conservatives may be more likely than liberals to utilize a “seize and freeze” style of 
cognition that emphasizes initial, automatic judgments (Kruglanski et al., 2006) such as those 
provided by social category knowledge (e.g., stereotypes). Similarly, categories such as sex and 
race have historically served conservative motivations for social hierarchy and status quo by 
perpetuating status differences between groups (Bem, 1993; Markus, 2008; Markus & Moya, 
2010). 
Interestingly, the present investigation revealed that ideological differences in the use of 
social class categories occurred in the opposite fashion predicted by the cognitive styles 
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hypothesis. Specifically, the present findings suggested that liberals were more likely than 
conservatives to 1) endorse beliefs of social class categories as a useful and informative 
principle to organize and explain society, and 2) deliberately apply social class categories 
during interpersonal judgments. These findings instead support a social-cognitive model of 
“motivated” adjustments (e.g., Skitka et al., 2002), emphasizing that liberals and conservatives 
are both motivated to deliberately understand the world in ways that confirm their ideological 
positions (Kahan, 2013; Peterson, Skov, Serritzlew, & Ramsoy, 2013; Washburn & Skitka, 
2018). In particular, the present findings suggest that social categories are not necessarily 
“liberal” or “conservative” tools inherently. What matters is how social categories are used to 
satisfy motivations. Racial categories, for example, may be motivationally utilized to 
discriminate against others (Markus, 2008) or to promote affirmative-action hiring and 
admission practices (Norton, Vandello, & Darley, 2004). Sex categories may also be 
deliberately used or suppressed in a motivationally-dependent fashion. For example, although 
liberals are generally accepting of the theory of evolution, they are selectively skeptical of 
evidence suggesting biological differences between sexes (von Hippel & Buss, 2017). Likewise, 
political ideology predicts the extent to which people broadly amplify the accomplishments 
disadvantaged social groups (e.g., women, blacks) or advantaged social groups (e.g., men, 
whites) (Kteily, Rocklage, McClanahan, & Ho, 2019). Taken together, past literature and the 
present findings suggest that liberals may deliberately use social class categories more than 
conservatives because the categories serve motivations for equality and change.   
Context-dependent moderation of social class category usage. The present research 
also has implications for how liberals and conservatives use social class categories across 
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contexts. In this section, I consider potential situational factors that theoretically predict how 
social class categories are deliberately used.     
 Inequality. First, inequality should predict social category usage. The present research 
suggests that liberals may endorse greater social class beliefs than conservatives because those 
beliefs provide an informational basis to advocate for change and equality. As a result, when 
inequality in an environment is high, social class categorizations may be an increasingly useful 
principle through which liberals attempt to organize and understand their social words. In 
contrast, high levels of inequality should motivate conservatives to justify social hierarchy and 
subsequently report lesser SCOP beliefs. Social class as organizing principle beliefs may also be 
elevated in high-inequality environments because the saliency of social class differences rises 
with situational inequality, particularly for those at the high and low ends of the social hierarchy 
(Côté et al., 2017). That is, high inequality creates powerful barriers in education, workplaces, 
neighborhoods, and recreation, that separates those from relatively higher and lower class 
backgrounds and thus creates more distinct social class groups (Ridgeway, 2014). Thus, social 
class categories should be more salient and informative features of a society when in equality is 
high. 
Culture. I have argued that culture and history are integral to why US liberals and 
conservatives differently endorse social class as a useful and informative organizing principle. 
Meritocratic ideas are foundational US society, and the notion of systemically created, stable 
“social classes” runs counter to that tradition of the American Dream (Kraus, Davidai, 
Nussbaum, 2015; Kraus & Tan, 2015). By extension, the liberal-conservative differences in 
beliefs of social class as an organizing principle observed in Studies 1 & 3-5 should not 
generalize across all cultures. For example, cultures that are explicitly structured around a caste 
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system (e.g., India; Pick & Dayaram, 2006) should more strongly endorse the notion of social 
class categories (or caste categories) as an organizing social feature. Furthermore, to the extent 
that caste categories are utilized in India to reinforce the social-hierarchical status quo, SCOP 
beliefs should have the exact opposite relationship with political ideology as they do in the US. 
Specifically, conservatives in India should report greater beliefs that social class (caste) 
categories are a useful and informative principle for organizing society. On the other hand, 
liberals in India should report lesser beliefs of social class as an organizing principle and be less 
likely to use social class (caste) categories during interpersonal perception and judgment and 
decision making.  
Resource scarcity. Resource scarcity may also predict tendencies to organize the world 
along social class lines. Specifically, high-scarcity conditions should predict greater social class 
category usage, and lower resource scarcity should predict lesser social class category usage. 
Social categories are adaptive cognitive tools because they automatically and efficiently 
organize social others into “groups” associated with content knowledge. Put simply, social 
categories save cognitive resources. Thus, in high-scarcity conditions, where executive 
functioning may be compromised (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013; Shah, Mullainathan, & Shafir 
2012), individuals should be more likely to utilize social categories to structure and understand 
the world (Rodeheffer, Hill, & Lord, 2012). In addition, individuals should be more likely to use 
social class categories in resource-scarce conditions because scarcity is associated with a lack of 
control over one’s environment. Lack of environmental control, in turn, prompts individuals to 
seek a cohesive and well-structured understanding of the environment (Landau, Kay, & 
Whitson, 2015). Social categories provide structure and cohesion to individuals’ social worlds 
(Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998), making them excellent cognitive tools when individuals lack 
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control. Taken together, resource-scarce individuals, who also characteristically lack 
environmental control, may be particularly prone to seek the structure of social class categories.  
7.4 Limitations 
The present research is not without limitations. One inevitable limitation concerns the 
specific terminology of social class categories used in the present research. I primarily 
investigated how people think about class categories specifically via the label of “social classes” 
(e.g., using the SCOP scale from Studies 1, 3-5), and with an emphasis on interpersonal 
perceptions of the “working class” and “upper class” (Study 2). However, many different social 
class categories can be used to understand and organize social hierarchy, and each category will 
inevitably encompass unique facets of social class, such as different content knowledge, values, 
and beliefs of individuals (Durante & Fiske, 2017). For example, Study 2 may have used “the 
rich” and “blue collar” categories instead of “upper class” and “working class.” This would 
have likely activated similar, but distinct class-relevant knowledge. Likewise, the Occupy Wall 
Street movement popularized the “99%” categorization, which has since become a 
conversational staple (Stelter, 2011). Others utilize class categorizations such as the bottom 
20% and top 20% of income earners (Norton & Ariely, 2011), or focus on wealth distributions 
rather than income distributions (De Nardi, 2004). Others create class categorizations that 
emphasize occupational differences, such as those between CEOs and typical workers (Mishel 
& Davis, 2015). Each categorization may offer a unique perspective on how social classes, 
broadly speaking, are activated and deliberately used by liberals and conservatives.  
7.5 Implications for Future Social Class Research 
The present findings are also an invitation for research investigating social class as a 
social category. Researchers have become increasingly interested in the psychology of social 
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class, perhaps due in part to rising global economic inequality (Piketty & Saez, 2014). The 
resurgent research interest in social class has produced several distinct theoretical perspectives 
that investigate, for example, how social class shapes social-cognitive functioning, (Kraus & 
Stephens, 2012; Kraus, Tan, & Tannenbaum, 2013), cultural differences in social class 
(Bourdieu, 1979; Fiske & Markus, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 2003), how resource scarcity 
shapes executive functioning and decision making (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2014), and how 
early life resources shape life-long behavioral strategies (Belsky, 1997; Griskevicius, Tybur, 
Delton, & Robertson, 2010). 
However, and with a few exceptions (e.g., Bjornsdottir & Rule, 2017; Kraus, Park, Tan, 
2017; Kraus & Keltner, 2009), little work has investigated how social classes categories are 
mechanistically perceived and utilized during judgment and decision making. In fact, in one 
meta-analysis of intergroup relations, “social class” was so infrequently studied that it was 
lumped into a miscellaneous “others” category (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In contrast, social-
cognitive researchers have generated a tremendous understanding of category activation and 
usage of the social categories of sexual orientation (Stern et al., 2013), race (Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991; Hoshino-Browne & Kunda, 2000) and gender (Kray, Howland, Russell, & Jackman, 
2017; Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009). The lack of research on how people 
cognitively process social class categories is surprising considering that individuals report 
strong and consistent self-identified social class group memberships across time (DiMaggio, 
2012; Fiske & Markus, 2012). In short, the current research suggests the need for a deeper 
theoretical understanding of the social-cognitive properties and functions of social class as a 




7.6 Conclusion  
Liberal-conservative disagreements on economic policies drive rifts that produce large 
scale problems which profoundly impact people’s everyday lives. For example, policy 
disagreements undermine the creation of educational and work opportunities for economically 
disadvantaged people, fail to produce affordable healthcare, and produce government 
shutdowns. Previous explanations have been proposed for why liberals and conservatives 
disagree on economic policy, such as differences in attributions for inequality. Without 
detracting from these previous explanations, the present research draws on multiple perspectives 
to propose that liberal-conservative disagreements on economic policies may also stem from 




TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 
Social class as an organizing principle scale items  
Item Phrasing 
1 Talking about “social class” in the United States is unnecessary. 
2 People who go on about “social classes” in the United States are just looking 
for something to complain about. 
3 There is no such thing as “social class” in the United States. 
4 (r) Political leaders in the United States should talk about “social class” when 
working through and solving society's problems.  
5 (r) It is important for public schools in the United States to teach about “social 
class.” 
6 The idea of describing a person as falling into a “social class” in the United 
States is ridiculous. 
7 (r) Classifying people into “social classes” is a realistic way of describing 
individuals’ economic experiences in the United States. 
8 When people describe individuals in the United States as falling into different 
“social classes,” they are just making up social and economic differences that 
don’t really exist. 








Descriptors offered in the deliberate task (Study 2) 
Area Terms 
Citizenship American, Foreign-born 
Leadership Qualities Dominant, Submissive, Confident, Unconfident 
Physical Attributes Heavy, Skinny, Tall, Short, Medium-build, Strong, Weak 
Sexual Orientation Straight, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer 
Religion Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Atheist/Agnostic 
Military Status Civilian, Ex-Military, Active Military 
Age Young, Middle-aged, Old 
Sex Male, Female 
Disability Status Able-bodied, Partly-disabled, Severely-disabled 
Friendliness Friendly, Unfriendly 
Work Ethic Hard-working, Lazy, Diligent, Unmotivated 
Sincerity Sincere, Honest, Disingenuous, Deceptive 
Attractiveness Attractive, Unattractive, Moderately Attractive 
Emotions Happy, Sad, Proud, Loyal, Embarrassed 
Social Class Lower Class, Working Class, Upper Class, Middle Class 
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Note. “Class label reliability” indicates the interrater reliability of the hypothesize social class 
(i.e., the percentage of participants that selected “upper class” or “working class” to categorize 
each photo). “Ideology & label r” indicates the point-biserial correlation between participants’ 
















class typicality & 
ideology correlation 
Item Phrasing M SD r 
1 I prefer waffles over pancakes. 4.30 1.00 0.02 
2 I really enjoy horror movies. 3.71 1.06 0.01 
3 I enjoy going to the movies. 3.85 1.12 -0.05 
4 I prefer to have cold drinks regardless of what 
the temperature is. 4.23 0.97 0.05 
5 I am easily awakened by noise. 4.19 1.16 0.06 
6 There is a public park near where I live. 3.73 1.50 -0.09 
7 Traffic jams are really frustrating. 4.13 1.33 0.05 
8 I watch the Super Bowl for the commercials. 3.88 1.48 0.04 
9 I find clowns terrifying. 4.14 1.01 0.00 
10 I like to read magazines in my free time. 4.18 1.36 0.03 
11 I've never had a problem with large crowds. 4.12 1.28 0.01 
12 I prefer summer over winter. 4.09 1.07 0.00 
13 My cousin is 13 years old. 3.89 0.79 0.06 
14 Shopping is no fun anymore. 3.66 1.65 -0.02 
15 I like to have a drink or two at the end of the 
day to unwind. 4.17 1.27 0.07 
16 I prefer green grapes over purple grapes. 4.20 0.90 0.05 
17 I prefer thick crust pizza over thin crust pizza. 3.71 1.04 0.08 
18 I prefer Coke to Pepsi. 4.06 1.02 0.05 
Note. “Perceived social class typicality” indicates responses to the question “please indicate the 
extent to which you believe the statement is more true of the types of things that working class 
or upper class people would typically say or think” (1 = More true of working class people, 7 = 
more true of upper class people). Effect size rs (not shown) were computed with respect to the 
scale midpoint (4), all rs < .10. “Perceived social class typicality & ideology correlation” 
indicates the correlation (r) between perceived social class typicality scores and participants’ 




Zero-order correlations among variables (Study 3) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Political ideology -     
2. Social dominance orientation .41*** -    
3. System confidence beliefs .30*** .42*** -   
4. Tolerance to ambiguity .23*** .23*** .19*** -  
5. Social class as an organizing principle -.26*** -.34*** -.19*** -.16*** - 
Note. Higher political ideology scores indicate greater conservatism (or lesser liberalism). 
Higher scores of tolerance to ambiguity represent greater epistemic needs (e.g., need for 







Items assessing identification with country (Study 4) 
Item Phrasing 
1 I have spent time trying to find out more about the United States [Canada], such 
as its history, traditions, and customs. 
2 I feel strong ties with people in the United States [Canada]. 
3 I identify with people in the United States [Canada]. 
4 (r) I feel that I am very different from people in the United States [Canada]. 
5  The social and economic affairs of the United States [Canada] are important to 
me. 
6 I feel a strong attachment towards the United States [Canada]. 











Regression analysis of SCOP beliefs on political ideology and target country in Study 4 
(secondary analysis) 





      
Target Country (US vs. Canada) -0.21 -3.51 .001 -0.33 -0.09 
Political Ideology -0.36 -5.40 <.001 -0.49 -0.23 
Political Ideology × Target Country 0.07 1.02 .307 -0.06 0.20 
Perceptions of Inequality -0.04 -0.67 .506 -0.16 0.08 
Perceptions of Inequality × Target Country 0.09 1.46 .145 -0.03 0.21 
Country Identification  0.12 1.79 .075 -0.01 0.25 











Items assessing attitudes towards hierarchy attenuating policies (Study 5)  
Item Phrasing 
1 The government should increase support for people receiving food stamps. 
2 The government should spend more money on preschool or other early 
education programs in poor neighborhoods.  
3 The government should provide special college scholarships for children from 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds who maintain good grades. 
4 The government should provide a job to anyone who wants one. 
5 The government should create a free universal health care system. 
6 The government should not have to provide housing for those who cannot 
afford it. (r) 
7 The government should provide more chances for children from poor families 
to go to college 
8 The government should spend less on benefits for the poor. (r) 
9 We should not spend any more federal money on programs that assist Blacks 
(r) 
10 The government should strive to hire people of color more. 
11 The government should provide a decent standard of living for the 
unemployed. 





Zero-order correlations among study variables (Study 5) 
Measure 1 2 3 
1. Political ideology -   
2. Social class as an organizing principle -.22*** -  
3. Attitudes towards hierarchy attenuating policy -.38*** .24*** - 
Note. For political ideology, higher scores indicate greater conservatism (or lesser liberalism). 









Figure 1. Raw score responses on automatic (“Who Said What?”) and deliberate (descriptor 
































Figure 2. Sum of descriptor mentions across all six photos in the deliberate task by descriptor 


















































Figure 3. Mediation model showing the effect of ideology on beliefs of social class as an 
organizing principle, as mediated by epistemic needs, social dominance orientation and system 
confidence beliefs (Study 3). All values are standardized coefficients. Values in parentheses 
represent direct relationships; values without parentheses represent relationships after including 
all variables in the model.  *p < .05, **p < .01, **p < .001.  
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Figure 4. Mediation model showing the effect of ideology on social policy attitudes as mediated 
by beliefs of social class as an organizing principle (Study 5). All values are standardized 
coefficients. Values in parentheses represent direct relationships; values without parentheses 
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